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HOW ETHICAL IS ABRAHAM'S
"SUSPENSION OF THE ETHICAL"?
Joseph A. Magno
Early in his discussion of Fear and Trembling's Problema I-"Is there .i Teleological Suspension of the Ethical?"-Kierkegaard puts to himself the question,
whether this story [of Abraham's command by God to sacrifice his son,
Isaac] contains any higher expression for the ethical that can ethically
explain his behavior, can ethically justify his suspending the ethical
obligation to the son, but without moving beyond the teleology of the
ethical. I
How did Kierkegaard resolve this self-imposed query as to the ethicality of
Abraham's act of faith? That, as those at all familiar with Kierkegaard's Fear
and Trembling know only too well, is precisely the exegetical case in point! For
among those scholars who venture to interpret Kierkegaard herein, we may
generically list no less than three widely divergent views. First, there are those
who contend that Kierkegaard supplies absolutely no ethical warrant for
Abraham's intended faith-act, and so view Abraham's suspension of the ethical
irrationalistically, that is, as opposing the ethical. 2 At the other extreme are those
who argue that while Abraham's faith-act cannot be reduced to sheer ethical
justification, since on such a reduction Abraham's act would not be afaith-act,
Kierkegaard nonetheless shows that there is no opposition between Abraham's
faith and ethics, and so regard Abraham's suspension of the ethical in a suprarationalist light, that is, as transcending, not negating, the ethical,3 Finally,
there is what I shall designate a 'third force,' whose principal, shared contention
is that it is beside the point to debate whether Kierkegaard does or does not
ethically vindicate Abraham, that in truth Kierkegaard is primarily about something else entirely. What this something else is receives many and varying
interpretations, but of these the following seem most typical. Thus, some maintain
that the purpose of Fear and Trembling is "not to defend faith .... The book is
a polemical slam against those [rationalists] who twaddle about 'going beyond'
faith."4 Others hold that Kierkegaard means to justify Abraham not in virtue of
reason, but rather in virtue of faith, essentially through arguing that "by faith,
what appears absurd ... [becomes] transformed."5 Lastly, some subscribe to the
opinion that "Kierkegaard's main concern is with contrasting faith as mental
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assent with faith as a way of life, i.e., with truth as a quality of life not as a
quality of propositions."6
Now of these three classes of opinion-irrationalist, suprarationalist, and 'third
force'-the latter, I submit, must be dismissed as a legitimate generic interpretation of Kierkegaard's primary intent in Fear and Trembling. I underscore
"primary" because, while I am prepared to concede that this 'third force' has
unearthed what for Kierkegaard may be significant secondary intentions, I cannot
agree that there is textual warrant for its claim that Kierkegaard considered a
rational defense of Abraham's ethicality oflittle or no importance. That a distinction must be drawn between Kierkegaard's primary and likely secondary intents
may be seen through closer inspection of Kierkegaard's notion of ethics in Fear
and Trembling.
How does Kierkegaard envision the ethical in this work? As has been justly
observed, it is difficult precisely to say. 7 Yet, whatever Kierkegaard may specifically mean by the ethical herein, it is at least patent that to him the ethical is
all of a piece with what he terms "the universal." Consider the following
exemplary passages:
The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to
everyone, which from another angle means that it applies at all times.
It rests immanent in itself, has nothing outside itself that is its T~ho<;
[end, purpose] but is itself the T~ho<; for everything outside itself, and
when the ethical has absorbed this into itself, it goes not further. 8
If the ethical-that is, social morality-is the highest.. .then no
categories are needed other than what Greek philosophy had or what
can be deduced from them by consistent thought. 9
The ethical as such is the universal; as the universal it is in tum the
disclosed. 10
From these passages I think we may safely gather that, however else Kierkegaard may view the ethical, he minimally regards it as involving (1) the
normative universal--4:ategories of right and wrong conduct applicable to all,
irrespective of temporal and local circumstances, (2) the immanent--4:ategories
which neither admit of nor require higher categories of conduct, (3) the intelligible--4:ategories inherently understandable by all, and (4) the public--4:ategories
inherently communicable to all. In a word, in Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard
envisions the ethical as expressive of autonomous normative categories, intrinsically understandable by and therefore communicable to all persons.
Moreover, if the preceding represents at least Kierkegaard's minimal appreciation of ethics in Fear and Trembling, we may further infer that in this work
he construes the ethical as decidedly the province of reason. For qua universal,
the ethical is perforce a function of reason, since the universal as such is reason's
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object. More to the point, the ethical is a function of reason's normative judgment
to the effect that, "X is good (or bad) because X does (or does not) conform to
universal prescription Y."
But given the necessary connection of ethics to reason in Fear and Trembling,
it becomes clear why this 'third force' must be disallowed as a permissible
interpretation of Kierkegaard' s primary intent in this opus: if Kierkegaard regards
ethics as the normative expression of reason-as the ethico-rational, if you
will-any determination of Abraham's ethicality can only be primarily resolved
insofar as his conduct accords with the dictates of reason. Nor, for that matter,
does it ultimately matter whether Kierkegaard consciously made the latter intent
his primary intent. What does ultimately matter is that, in view of the necessary
and subordinate relation of ethics to reason herein, Kierkegaard ipso facto commits himself to determining how Abraham's faith stands vis-a-vis the rational,
or better yet, the ethico-rational. In short, either Kierkegaard does ethico-rationally vindicate Abraham within the textual perimeters of Fear and Trembling, or
he does not. There is no third alternative.
Finally, and in a similar vein, neither does it particularly matter that Kierkegaard
penned this book under a pseudonym-Johannes de Silenti~thereby making
it reasonable to assume, as has often been noted, that the book does not entirely
reflect his true position on the faith/ethics relationship. II Even granting this
assumption, it has no real bearing on our present inquiry. For what we are
presently about is ascertaining, not Kierkegaard's definitive estimate of the faith/
ethico-rational relationship, 12 but rather and simply what he has to say about this
relationship in Fear and Trembling. Thus, the purpose of this inquiry is quite
modest: it is solely to assess the compatibility of faith and ethico-reason within
the pages of Fear and Trembling.
On this reckoning, then, there remain but two interpretive possibilities,
irrationalism or suprarationalism. Which interpretation does Fear and Trembling
warrant? My answer is irrationalism. However, before proceeding to argue this
answer-and indeed, so that we might proceed to argue this answer-it will be
necessary, first, to clarify our earlier mention of irrationalism as a point of view
"opposed to" the ethical. Exactly what is meant by "opposed" in this context?
One cannot exactly say. Typically, irrationalism is taken to denote that which
is "contrary to reason. "13 But such a characterization is notoriously imprecise. 14
Be this as it may, the fact is that when critics see fit to adjudge Fear and
Trembling "contrary to reason," they invariably mean to suggest either (1) that
the work contradicts reason, or (2) that the work is simply meaningless. Such
being these critics' primary senses of irrationalism, we need only inquire as to
Fear and Trembling's susceptibility to either or both of these senses. Should
Fear and Trembling prove immune to both species of irrationalism, we may rest
assured that, whatever other senses "contrary to reason" may permit, this work
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is neither contradictory nor meaningless in its presentation of the faith/ethicorational relationship--and that, to my mind, is more than sufficient to establish
this work as not contrary to reason.
But specifically what is meant by these two senses of irrationalism? How do
they differ from one another? In fact, do they differ from one another? Toward
answering these questions, consider, first, the contradictory assertion, "A is not
A." This is evidently contrary to reason and therefore irrational. But it is not
thereby meaningless. Far from it. For the assertion presupposes recognition that
a term with defining property "A," which is only to say, a term which means
"A," is being affirmed and denied at the same time and in the same respect. In
other words, a term's meaningfulness is a necessary condition of contradiction
itself. The assertion, "A is meaningless," on the other hand, is another matter
altogether. This assertion entails nothing less than the utter inaccessibility of
"A" to any and all evidential verification; and, since knowledge is perforce a
function of such verification, the absolute unknowability of "A." Now what is
per se unknowable can be neither affirmed nor denied, in that there is, cognitively
speaking, literally nothing to affirm or deny. But what can be neither affirmed
nor denied cannot, of course, be contradicted. Hence, the meaning, distinction,
and fundamental irreducibility of these two senses of irrationalism to one another.
In light of this clarification, I may now specify the precise sense in which I
account Fear and Trembling an irrationalist statement. In the following section,
I shall argue, against the prevalent irrationalist persuasion, that this work is not
vulnerable to the verdict of irrationalism by reason of contradiction, that, in
truth, there exists no inherent opposition between Abraham's faith and ethicoreason. Proponents of this sense of irrationalism have, in my opinion, failed to
exploit Fear and Trembling'S exegetical potential and, to that extent, have sold
this work far too short. But invulnerability to contradiction does not in itself
insure success against the charge of irrationalism, as we have indicated. Thus,
in the final section, I shall explore Fear and Trembling's susceptibility to the
second species of irrationalism, that by reason of meaninglessness. I shall show
that the demonstration of a meaningful relation between Abraham's faith and
ethico-reason hinges on this work's capacity to furnish probabilistic evidence
supportive of Abraham's faith. But, as I shall further show, this work neither
does nor can furnish such evidence. So that, in the end, Fear and Trembling,
notwithstanding the noncontradictory status of its treatment of faith and ethicoreason, is an irrational document, susceptible to the verdict of irrationalism under
the aspect of meaninglessness.
I

That many find Fear and Trembling conspicuously irrationalistic is readily
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understandable from the fact that it is liberally sprinkled throughout with passages
such as these:
The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he meant to murder
Isaac; the religious expression is that he meant to sacrifice Isaac-but
precisely in this contradiction is the anxiety that can make a person
sleepless .... '5
[F]aith [is] a paradox that makes a murder into a holy and God-pleasing
act, a paradox ... which no thought can grasp, because faith begins precisely where thought stops .... 16
Faith is precisely the paradox that the single individual as the single
individual is higher than the [ethical] universal, is justified before it,
not as inferior to it but as superior .... This position cannot be mediated,
for all mediation takes place only by virtue of the universal; it is and
remains for all eternity a paradox, impervious to thought. 17
Abraham represents faith and [is] therefore ... either a murderer or a man
of faith. IS
Were these and like sentiments indicative of Kierkegaard's sole sentiments on
the faithlethico-rational relationship in Fear and Trembling, one would be hard
pressed, I submit, not to dismiss this work as hopelessly irrationalistic. In actuality, though, Kierkegaard is not content to leave the matter at that. Well into
the book, subsequent to yet another of those citations which appear utterly to
preclude any possible link between faith and ethico-reason, Kierkegaard asserts
that,
From this it does not follow that the ethical should be invalidated; rather,
the ethical receives a completely different expression, a paradoxical
expression, such as, for example, that love to God may bring the knight
of faith to give his love to the neighbor-an expression opposite to that
which, ethically speaking, is duty. 19
For present purposes, two things are especially noteworthy about this passage.
First, Kierkegaard's initial sentence-"From this it does not follow that the
ethical should be invalidated"--can hardly be construed as anything other than
a suprarationalist assertion. If, as Kierkegaard declares, in faith the ethical is
not invalidated, he can only mean to imply thereby that in faith the ethical
persists and is in some sense operative-a perfectly apposite description of
suprarationalism. The second striking feature about this passage is that,
immediately subsequent to this suprarationalist assertion, Kierkegaard appends
the statement, "the ethical receives a completely different expression ... an expression opposite to that which, ethically speaking, is duty," which seems to belie
his original, suprarationalist assertion, and so to recapitulate Fear and Trembl-
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ing's ostensibly irrationalist motif.
What are we to make of these seemingly incongruous assertions? Unfortunately,
there appears to be no hope of ascertaining Kierkegaard's actual intent here,
since nowhere, as far as I can determine, does he volunteer such information.
We have, it would seem, no more to go on than the passage itself, and what we
might interpretively infer therefrom.
As to interpreting this passage, let me first call attention to the passage's
potential exegetical significance. Far from being an irrelevant and/or gratuitous
gloss on Kierkegaard's part, the passage actually serves as a concrete test case,
so to speak, of the compatibility of Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion with
all seemingly irrationalist utterances in Fear and Trembling. For insofar as the
passage's subsequent assertion seems to court irrationalism, any reconciliation
between the latter assertion and the initial suprarationalist assertion would effectively mean the reconciliation of faith and ethico-reason in Fear and Trembling
writ large.
But a determination of such re!):oncilability itself presupposes the legitimacy
of Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion. By legitimacy here I understand a
demonstration establishing that this assertion is not merely arbitrary or questionbegging, that there exists evidence supportive of its claim to be in keeping with
ethico-reason. What would count as such evidence? Let me suggest a demonstration establishing that this assertion neither contradicts ethico-reason nor is in
itself meaningless--in other words, a demonstration showing that this assertion
is unsusceptible to the verdict of irrationalism in either of the aforesaid senses.
To this end, I shall first consider whether Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion
is liable to an irrationalist estimate by reason of contradiction, then consider
same by reason of meaninglessness.
To demonstrate that Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion does not contradict
ethico-reason, is effectively to demonstrate that Abraham's act of faith, though
qua faith-act beyond reason, yet (a) does not contravene the ethico-rational
proscription of murder, because (b) his faith-act is consistent with, and therefore
justifiable in virtue of, a positive ethico-rational precept.
Furthermore, since the issue is murder, said demonstration requires an unexceptionable statement of what murder essentially is. Accordingly, I think we
may safely suggest that, whatever the multifarious species and contexts of murder,
in essence it consists of the premeditated (i.e., voluntary and deliberated) and
unjust taking of human life. Now while each term of this definition-'premeditated,' 'unjust,' and 'taking of human life' -is, I maintain, indispensable to an
adequate generic characterization of murder, certainly the most indispensable of
these is the qualifier, 'unjust.' That is to say, murder is specifically wrong
because it designates an action egregiously opposed to justice.
On this specification, we may now say that any would-be defense of Kier-
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kegaard's suprarationalist assertion must establish (a) that Abraham's faith-act
does not contradict the ethico-rational proscription of murder, precisely because
(b) his faith-act is consistent with, and therefore justifiable in virtue of, the
positive ethico-rational precept of justice. The following, I believe, shows just
such consistency to obtain.
If God is author of life and death-and there is certainly nothing to prevent
our assuming as much-it follows that God may give and take life sans injustice.
This conclusion, be it noted, pertains unqualifiedly even to innocent human life.
The so-called "state of innocence" here denotes the absence of moral fault, and
hence exemption from what theologians are wont to call "moral death." This
state, however, does not entail exemption from physical death, which qua physical, bears no necessary relation to one's moral status. Whence, as author of life
and death, God may justly elect to take even innocent human life.
Moreover, should God so choose to take human life, innocent or no, God
may choose to do so through human mediation sans injustice. This follows from
the principle that what is rightfully one's own may be justly conferred upon or
delegated to another. Hence, God could legitimately command a person, in His
stead, to take even innocent human life, and the person so enjoined would be
at once obligated and justified thereto: obligated, in that God has commanded
him; justified, in that God has justly commanded him.
Now murder, we have noticed, is morally wrong specifically and ultimately
because it contravenes the ethico-rational precept of justice. But anyone acting
in accord with God's command to take human life acts justly, as we have seen;
and anyone who so acts subserves the ethico-rational principle of justice; whence,
anyone who so acts is not and indeed cannot be adjudged a murderer. There is,
then, no inherent contradiction between Abraham's faith-act and ethico-reason;2o
and Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion is not susceptible to the charge of
irrationalism by dint of contradiction.
But granting that Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion has been found noncontradictory to ethico-reason, how reconcilable is this assertion with his 'subsequent assertion,' which, we recall, epitomizes the seemingly contradictory
association between faith and ethico-reason in Fear and Trembling? The answer
is that these assertions are in contradiction only if we regard Abraham's doings
apart from the supposition of his faith. Apart from this supposition, Abraham's
actions become "completely different" than what is prescribed by ethico-reason,
and Abraham is a murderer. Suppose faith, however, and Abraham's conduct
becomes consonant with the ethico-rational standard of justice, and Abraham
stands vindicated. And what permits this all-important supposition? Precisely
the foregoing demonstration that Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion is not
irrationalistic by virtue of contradiction. In short, if, as has been shown, there
exists no contradiction in supposing Abraham's faithfulness, then neither does
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there exist any reason not to grant the reconcilability of these assertions on the
supposition of Abraham's faithfulness.
II

There remains to be considered the second sense of irrationalism, that by dint
of meaninglessness. To see how Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion fares
on this sense, we must reintroduce the fact that the preceding demonstration
reposes on the supposition that Abraham is verily a man of faith. Now this
supposition, we noticed, was permissible in that its acceptance proved noncontradictory. As such, the preceding demonstration may be taken as internal evidence supportive of said supposition, that is, evidence to the effect that there is
nothing logically amiss or inconsistent in supposing Abraham's faithfulness.
Positively stated, the preceding demonstration effectively shows that Abraham's
conduct could be in line with ethico-reason. But to show that something could
be the case, is not of course to show that something actually is the case. Yet
the latter is precisely what must be demonstrated if we are to establish the
meaningfulness of Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion. Hence, in this section, the task is to investigate whether Abraham's behavior actually does conform
to the prescriptions of ethico-reason.
To demonstrate such conformity, however, is effectively to show that there
exists, not just internal evidence supportive thereof, but external evidence, as
well. External evidence here denotes concrete behavioral evidence to the effect
that Abraham did act in faith. Merely to suppose that Abraham did so act-however noncontradictory this supposition-is implicitly to assert that no behavioral
(external) evidence can support this supposition. But if absolutely nothing can
count as external, behavioral evidence that Abraham is a man of faith, and if
meaning is perforce a function of such evidence, then the supposition that
Abraham acted in faith (and therefore that his conduct conforms to ethico-reason)
is effectively meaningless. And in this event, Kierkegaard's suprarationalist
assertion, notwithstanding its noncontradictory status, would be yet subject to
the verdict of irrationalism by reason of meaninglessness.
For this reason, then, it is incumbent upon us to examine whether any external
or behavioral evidence supports the supposition of Abraham's faith. But no
sooner do we reach this conclusion than we meet a perhaps obvious objection.
Succinctly put, the objection is based on the epistemic truism that faith-claims,
qua faith-claims, are ipso facto irreducible to evidential verification. If so, any
would-be quest after external evidence of Abraham's faithfulness is seemingly
doomed from the start. So that the only apparent alternative is to own that
Kierkegaard's faith-supposition is unsusceptible to external evidential support,
and thus that his suprarationalist assertion is, from the start, irrationalistic by
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reason of meaninglessness.
I would suggest that this frequently voiced objection against the rational evincibility of faith-claims fails to differentiate two argumentive categories of evidence. Indeed, to maintain that faith is per se irreducible to evidence is in
actuality to affirm that faith is per se indemonstrable: that faith is by definition
unsupportable by argumentation whose conclusion is necessary and certain. Faith
is unsupportable by demonstrative argument because as such faith's object
exceeds reason. So that to purport to demonstrate what is of faith is either to
lapse into contradiction, or else to reduce an object of faith to an object of reason.
But to disallow, as we certainly must, the reducibility offaith to reason is not
necessarily to disallow the existence of evidence supportive of faith. It is only
and of necessity to disallow the existence of demonstratively supportive evidence.
There yet remains, I contend, at least the possibility of advancing evidence for
faith-claims which, though nondemonstrative, may nonetheless be supportive.
What might this nondemonstrative albeit supportive evidence be? Invoking a
distinction well known to philosophers past and present, I would propose probable
evidence, to wit, evidence which supports the likelihood or plausibility of a
given proposition. Pursuing evidence of this more modest ilk in behalf of faithclaims is not in principle to reduce faith to evidence. Faith's categorical autonomy,
its definitional transcendence of the evidence, is preserved, and the search for
evidence of Abraham's faith becomes merely an attempt to show that the supposition of his faith is in some sense intellectually respectable, if not intellectually
provable. In a word, nothing prohibits inquiry into the existence of external
evidence supportive of Abraham's faithfulness-provided, that is, that we understand thereby evidence serving as foundation of probable argumentation. Let us
now see if Fear and Trembling affords such evidence.
As a matter of recorded fact, the Kierkegaard of Fear and Trembling was
well aware of the social and moral necessity of detecting behavioral evidence
of the authentically faithful. He notes that, on the pretext of being inspired by
faith, "there are those who ... would abandon themselves like unmanageable animals to selfish appetites." For this reason, he continues, a person must "demonstrate 21 that he does not belong to them."22 And how does one so prove
oneself? In one primary way, answers Kierkegaard: insofar as the faithful experiences "fear and trembling" over "being unable to make himself understandable
to others."23 Such is Kierkegaard's proposed criterion of genuine faithfulness.
How adequate is it as probable evidence of Abraham's faithfulness?
To begin with, it is important that we understand what Kierkegaard has in
mind by the expression "fear and trembling," since he regards these sentiments
as the appropriate and distinctive response of the faithful to his inability to make
his actions understandable to others. In the context of Fear and Trembling, there
can be little doubt that by "fear" Kierkegaard understands "anxiety," specifically
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a state of unrest or inner tunnoil as to the ethical justifiability of one's conduct/4
and that by "trembling" he means the dramatic, physical manifestation of this
anxiety, and thus something of secondary, derivative significance. Anxiety,
accordingly, is synonymous with Kierkegaard's use of the tenn, fear, in Fear
and Trembling; and since trembling is causally subsequent to fear, it follows
that for all intents our inquiry into the probability of Kierkegaard's criterion of
the faithful resolves to this: just how distinctive of Abraham's faith is such
anxiety as a response to his unintelligibility to others?
I believe the answer must be in the negative, and for three principal reasons.
In the first place, while it is highly likely that, given the gravity of his intended
faith-act, Abraham's unintelligibility to others would elicit in him the sentiment
of anxiety as to the justifiability of his act, any such likelihood itself presupposes
Abraham's faithfulness, and so cannot constitute probable evidence for his faithfulness. In a word, on this objection, the question of Abraham's faithfulness is
patently begged.
Then again, it is difficult to see why such anxiety is any more indicative of
Abraham's faithfulness than of his non-faithfulness. I suspect we have all had
occasion to feel ill at ease over the justifiability of certain of our deeds in
consequence of others' incomprehension. But I wonder how often we have
experienced a need to regard our unrest at these times as significative of our
faithfulness? On this objection, then, Kierkegaard's criterion of the faithful, even
as probable evidence, is far too vague to serve as a discriminative test of the
faithful, and at worst, becomes an open invitation to moral and social anarchy.
The final and, in my view, most critical objection specifically concerns Kierkegaard's referral to the unintelligibility of Abraham's conduct to others. This
reference is particularly injurious to his criterion of faith because it effectively
situates Abraham's conduct beyond the pale of any and all evidential support,
such that nothing can count as the requisite external evidence of the Patriarch's
faithfulness. But, as has been seen (see pages 4,8), if Abraham's faithfulness is
radically unsusceptible to external support, and meaning is perforce a function
of such support, then Kierkegaard's assertion as to Abraham's faithfulness
becomes irremediably meaningless.
For these principal reasons, I conclude that there is no choice but to allow
that the supposition of Abraham's faith cannot be even probabilistic ally supported,
and hence that Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion must be accounted irrational ultimately and properly by reason of meaninglessness.
With this conclusion, Kierkegaard's question as to the ethicality of Abraham's
conduct, with which we began this inquiry, is resolved. For if, as we have
shown, Abraham's ethicality hinges on the reconcilability of Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion and his subsequent, seemingly irrationalist assertion; and
if, moreover, the establishment of such reconcilability was itself shown to hinge
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on a prior demonstration of the unsusceptibility of Kierkegaard' s suprarationalist
assertion to either species of irrationalism; then, having just demonstrated said
assertion's failure to escape this final test of irrationalism, we thereby prove the
irreconcilability of both assertions-and therefore, in answer to Kierkegaard's
question, the radical unethicality of Abraham's conduct. This question having
been resolved, our analysis of Abraham's ethicality as told in Fear and Trembling
is brought to a close.
Loras College
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